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ASK THE PROFESSOR: 
“OMG! WHAT DID MF 
GLOBAL DO?”1
B y  P r O f E s s O r  r O N A l D  f I l l E r 2
REPRINT ARTICLE
MF Global Inc. (“MFG”) was regis-
tered as a broker-dealer (“BD”) with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and as a futures commission mer-
chant (“FCM”) with the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). 
In fact, it was one of the largest U.S. FCMs 
with approximately $7,270,000,000 in 
customer segregated funds as of August 
31, 2011.3 On or about Sunday, October 
30, 2011, MFG reported to regulators4 
that a material shortfall appeared to exist 
in the amount of customer funds required 
to be segregated under the Commodity Ex-
change Act5 and CFTC Regulation 1.206 
promulgated thereunder.7 Shortly there-
after, MFG’s clearing privileges at several 
clearing houses were suspended and MFG 
was put on liquidation only trading status.8
James W. Giddens, the Bankruptcy 
Trustee appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court, stated in the SIPC’s Trustee Emer-
gency Motion:
1. More than 150,000 customer accounts 
were frozen on October 31st;
2. Of this total, more than 50,000 ac-
counts were trading futures contracts 
as of that date;
3. The Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (“CME”) estimated that 
MFG’s customer segregated funds 
should total approximately $5.45 
billion, and that the CME 
held approximately $4.0 bil-
lion in cash or collateral as of 
that date.
4. The Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (“SIPC”) filed an appli-
cation under the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970, as amended 
(“SIPA”),9 for the entry of a protec-
tive order placing MFG in liquida-
tion under SIPA as MFG could no 
longer comply with the requirements 
regarding financial responsibility un-
der Section 15(c)(3) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”)10 
and SEC Rules 15c3-3 and 17a-3.11
5. On October 31, 2011, the Honorable 
Paul Engelmayer, U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, 
entered an Order (“the MFG Liquida-
tion Order”) which commenced liqui-
dation of MFG pursuant to SIPA in a 
case captioned as: Securities Investor 
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Protection Corp. v. MF Global Inc., Case 
No. 11-CIV-7750 (PAE).
6. The MFG Liquidation Order appointed 
James W. Giddens as Trustee for the liquida-
tion of the business of MFG and appointed 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, as counsel to 
the Trustee.12
According to the SIPC Trustee’s Emergency 
Motion, there appears to be a shortfall in the 
amount of customer funds required to be held 
in segregation pursuant to CEA Section 4d13 and 
CFTC Regulation 1.2014 According to numerous 
media reports, the amount of this shortfall has 
ranged between $900 million on the high end to 
$600 million on the low end. This paper will ad-
dress what may have caused such shortfall and 
what actions may be pending.
Background
This author has written many articles recently 
on how futures customer funds must be held by 
an FCM, how the U.S. rules differ from similar 
customer fund rules in the U.K., and how initial 
margin is determined.15 As noted in these articles, 
one of the most important customer protection 
themes underlying the CEA and CFTC regula-
tions is the protection of customer assets, cash 
and collateral, held by an FCM to margin the 
customer’s underlying futures contracts. These 
rules are sacrosanct. Unlike checking and stock 
accounts, which have insurance programs, fund-
ed by the U.S. government and industry firms, to 
protect customers of banks (e.g., FDIC Insurance) 
and customers holding stock accounts (e.g., SIPC 
Insurance), futures customers do not receive any 
special insurance proceeds if their FCM files for 
bankruptcy, like MFG did.
However, the applicable laws and regulations 
strictly govern how FCMs must properly fund 
the customer segregated accounts and significant-
ly restrict how FCMs may invest the customer 
funds. For example, one important restriction is 
included in CFTC Regulation 1.25, which pro-
vides that an FCM may invest customer property 
in only certain permissible investments and holds 
the FCM liable for any losses that may result 
from such investments.16
Equally as important, upon deposit in a pro-
tected customer segregated account, customer 
funds must remain in such protected accounts 
until returned back to the customer. Therefore, 
whenever an FCM transfers funds to a deriva-
tives clearing organization (“DCO”), commonly 
referred to as a clearing house or central counter-
party, the funds held by a DCO must also comply 
with CFTC Regulation 1.20. Similarly, if a U.S. 
customer wants to trade futures on a non-U.S. 
futures exchange, the funds used to margin the 
non-U.S. futures positions must be held in an-
other protected account, called a secured amount 
account under CFTC Regulation 30.7.17 Thus, at 
all times, customer funds used to margin futures 
contracts are held in these protective accounts, 
solely for the benefit of the customers.18
Insolvency of an FcM
Whenever an FCM files for bankruptcy, and 
that FCM, like MFG, is jointly registered as both 
a BD and FCM, a SIPC Trustee is appointed. 
Thus, Mr. Giddens was appointed as the SIPC 
Trustee for MFG, just like he was when Lehman 
Brothers Inc. filed for bankruptcy in September 
2008. However, although SIPA plays an impor-
tant role with respect to any securities account 
held by customers of the BD/FCM, Part 190 of 
the CFTC Regulations provides key guidance 
with respect to the futures customer accounts 
held by the BD/FCM.19
An FCM’s insolvency does not necessarily 
mean that futures customers will be adversely 
impacted by any loss of funds. For example, two 
very large FCMs, REFCO in 2005 and Lehman 
Brothers in 2008, both filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection without incurring any futures customer 
losses to the extent such funds were held in a 
protected customer segregated account. In fact, 
this author, who was a Managing Director in 
the Capital Markets Prime Services Division at 
Lehman Brothers before joining the faculty at 
New York Law School, was invited back to as-
sist Lehman Brothers Inc. during that infamous 
week of September 15-19, 2008 to help move the 
underlying customer funds and open positions to 
other well-capitalized FCMs or liquidate the open 
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futures positions and return the margin property 
back to the respective customer. To say the least, 
it was an interesting and challenging week. The 
big difference between Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008 and MFG now is that the registered 
Lehman entity, Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”), 
had not filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008, the day that its parent company, Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc, and other Lehman affili-
ates filed for bankruptcy. However, with respect 
to MFG, both its parent company, MF Global 
Holdings Inc., and MFG, the registered BD/FCM, 
both filed for bankruptcy protection the same day. 
This difference provided customers of LBI with 
important opportunities and flexibility to transfer 
and/or liquidate open positions under their own 
direction and control, and to transfer the underly-
ing cash and collateral used to margin these open 
positions under their direction as well.
MFG’s Bankruptcy
MFG filed for bankruptcy on Monday, October 
31, 2011. While many of its customers may have 
moved their open positions and funds before that 
date, such transfers took place before the public 
was aware of its bankruptcy proceedings.20 Dur-
ing this first week, much was reported by vari-
ous media outlets but the full set of facts has not 
been made public, and will not be until all the 
various investigations now taking place by many 
parties, including the CFTC and the SEC, report 
their findings. However, Mr. Giddens did take 
some important actions through the Emergency 
Motion, providing important transfers of open 
positions and part of the underlying cash and col-
lateral used to fund these open positions.
On November 2, 2011, Judge Martin Glenn of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, issued an Order granting the 
Emergency Motion requested by Mr. Giddens, 
among other things:
1. The Trustee may continue to operate MFG in 
the ordinary course until 6:00pm on Friday, 
November 4th;
2. The Trustee shall use his best efforts to com-
plete the Account Transfers to one or more 
FCMs that have agreed to accept such open 
customer positions, together with up to 60% 
of the underlying customer property used to 
fund those open positions;21
3. The account transfers may not be avoided un-
der Section 764(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; 
and
4. The Trustee shall not be held liable to any 
claims that may result with any such trans-
fers.22
So, What Happened with MFG?
Like most players in the futures business, one 
can only speculate what actually happened that 
caused any shortfall in the customer funds held at 
MFG, if any shortfall does in fact exist. The truth 
and facts will soon be revealed. The following are 
only theories as to what might have happened. To 
be honest, given the excellent record of the futures 
industry protecting futures customer, this author, 
who has spent his past 35+ years defending this 
great industry, truly hopes that none of these the-
ories prove to be true.
1. The press has reported that MFG lost sub-
stantial amounts betting on European bonds 
and sovereign debts. What has not been re-
vealed is what MFG entity actually made 
these investments if, in fact, they were made 
and these investments resulted in substan-
tial losses under our mark-to-the-market 
accounting method. Were these investments 
made by MFG, the registered BD/FCM, or 
by another MF Global entity? If the former, 
then MFG would most likely not have the 
requisite regulatory capital to continue to op-
erate as a registered BD/FCM entity. This is 
the most likely scenario as Mr. Giddens in his 
Emergency Motion stated that MFG could 
no longer meet its requirements for financial 
responsibility but he provided little detail 
behind this statement. If, however, these so-
called European bets were made in a different 
MF Global entity, and that MF Global en-
tity was not guaranteed by MFG, then MFG 
could possibly continue to operate. Since this 
did not occur, and a SIPC Trustee was ap-
Futures & Derivatives Law Report  November 2011   n   Volume 31   n   Issue 10
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pointed, the former is presumably the most 
likely theory.
2. Even if MFG lost substantial amount of 
capital through these investments, or even 
through poor operating revenues, these facts 
should not have caused a shortfall in the cus-
tomer segregated account. The U.S. regula-
tory system is designed to protect all non-de-
faulting customers of an FCM. Based on the 
facts known to date, no large futures custom-
er at MFG traded in a manner that caused a 
large trading loss that caused MFG to file for 
bankruptcy. This is a key statement because 
applicable CEA and CFTC regulations were 
written in part from this perspective, that is, 
that a large futures customer could trade in 
such a manner that could result in the FCM’s 
bankruptcy. In other words, such a large one-
day trading loss exceeds the regulatory capital 
of the FCM resulting in its insolvency. Under 
this scenario, the clearing houses, pursuant 
to their rules, provides a systematic approach 
to stabilize the market and provide the neces-
sary amounts to those customers who earned 
trading profits from these same trades under 
the zero-sum game model. These procedures 
include, among other things, the use of guar-
anty funds, the right to assess non-defaulting 
clearing members and even using funds of the 
non-defaulting customers of the bankrupt 
FCM clearing member. However, this situa-
tion did not occur with MFG. Therefore, any 
shortfall presumably did not result from fu-
tures trading. However, if MFG did in fact 
invest its own capital in the European bonds, 
and thus lost substantial amounts, one must 
ask whether MFG took the necessary deduc-
tions from such regulatory capital, as these 
investments must be marked-to-the market 
on an ongoing basis.
3. The key question, and one bothering this 
author the most, is whether MFG misappro-
priated customer funds held in the protected 
account, improperly invested such funds 
outside the permissible investments set forth 
in CFTC Rule 1.25 or did properly comply 
with CFTC Rule 1.25 but did not replenish 
the segregated accounts in a timely manner 
as these permissible investments lost money. 
CFTC Rule 1.25 permits investments in obli-
gations of sovereign nations. It will be inter-
esting to see what type of investments were 
made by MFG with respect to the customer 
segregated funds.
Following the transfer of open positions and 
a major portion of the cash and collateral held 
to margin these open positions on November 
4th, other developments were noted by the SIPC 
Trustee, namely:
1. The SIPC Trustee had established procedures 
to transfer securities accounts held by MFG 
to other SIPC firms.
2. The SIPC Trustee has retained Ernst & 
Young as forensic accountants and Deloitte 
to assist in the account transfers and process-
ing of claims.
3. The SIPC Trustee has established a website 
and call center to facilitate communications 
with customers and creditors of MFG. The 
website is: www.mfglobaltrustee.com
Also note that all of the major clearing houses 
have issued advisories regarding the transfers of 
open positions and collateral. You should go to 
their websites to view updates and related issues. 
We also need more information regarding what’s 
happening with the transfer of open positions and 
collateral outside the U.S. as MFG’s customer ac-
counts traded futures globally. This may be the 
subject of a forthcoming article.
conclusion
As noted above, for the sake of this industry, 
I truly hope that none of these theories prove to 
be true. But if they do, one can only presume 
that regulatory changes are brewing at a time 
when the industry is undergoing major regula-
tory changes as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act.23 
Query, do we really need any such regulatory 
changes just because one firm may have acted in 
an improper way?
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